Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

Rick Firkins and All Star motion Picture Catering
Company v. Paul Reugner, Pig Boys, Inc., and
Walter Zelig : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephen W. Cook; Attorney for Appellees.
Olivia D. Uitto; Attorney for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Rick Firkins and All Star motion Picture Catering Company v. Paul Reugner, Pig Boys, Inc., and Walter Zelig, No. 20080685
(Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1095

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

FILED
PISTRICT COURT

Olivia D.Uitto (10649)
Attorney for Appellants
OliviaD. Uitto, Ph.D., P.C.
P.O. Box 711872
Salt Lake City, UT 84171
(801)943-3727

09 FEB f 3 AH 8: I I
f.ttf.) J L „ U , I A L D I - : T ; ; I C I
SALT LAKE COUNT\
BY.
DFPUT t CLERK

IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

RICK FIRKINS, and ALL STAR
MOTION PICTURE CATERING
COMPANY,
Appellants,

i

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AND BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE
DC Case No. 06090631
Appellate Case No. 20080685-CA

v.
PAUL RUEGNER, PIG BOYS, INC.
and Walter Zelig,

Trial Judge: Iwasaki

Appellees

Stephen W. Cook
Attorney for Appellees
230 S. 500 E., Suite 465
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Olivia D. Uitto
Attorney for Appellants
P.O. Box 711872
Salt Lake City, UT 84171
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS
FEB 13 2009

Olivia D.Uitto (10649)
Attorney for Appellants
OliviaD. Uitto, Ph.D., P.C.
P.O. Box 711872
Salt Lake City, UT 84171
(801)943-3727

IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

RICK FIRKINS, and ALL STAR
MOTION PICTURE CATERING
COMPANY,

|
|

Appellants,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AND BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE
DC Case No. 06090631
Appellate Case No. 20080685-CA

v.

Trial Judge: Iwasaki

PAUL RUEGNER, PIG BOYS, INC.
and Walter Zelig,
Appellees

Stephen W. Cook
Attorney for Appellees
230 S. 500 E., Suite 465
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

|

Olivia D. Uitto
Attorney for Appellants
P.O. Box 711872
Salt Lake City, UT 84171

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARGUMENT

4

I.

Once Firkins and Walter Shook Hands, a Contract was Formed

4

II.

Firkins did not Default on the Contract that was Formed

6

III. Firkins Held Legal Title to the Vehicles

8

IV. There was Insufficient Evidence to Support the Trial
Court's Finding that the Vehicles in Question were Worth
$100,000 at the Time of Conversion

12

V.

13

Firkins Did Not Convert Ruegner's Property

VI. The Court was Correct in Not Awarding Lost Income Damages

13

VII. The Court was correct in Not Awarding Punitive Damages

16

CONCLUSION

16

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993)

12

Carter v. Sorensen, 2004 UT 33, 90 P.3d 637

6

Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589

4

Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998)

8

Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT App 355,78 P.3d 988

13

Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130 (Utah 2001)

14

Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co.,
845 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1993)

11

Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, 7 P.3d 783

12

Madsen v. Madsen, 72 Utah 96, 269 P. 132 (1928)

12

Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 96 P.3d 893 (Utah 2004)

16

Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983)
Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, 989 P.2d 1077

8
4

3

ARGUMENT
I.

Once Firkins and Walter Shook Hands, a Contract was formed
Contrary to the arguments raised in the Appellee's brief, there was

insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that a contract did not exist between
Walter and Firkins because at the time of formation, the parties agreed to the
terms. Once Firkins and Walter shook hands there was a meeting of the minds and
a contract was formed. It is only several years later that Firkins is unable to recall
the purchase price; a purchase price that was reached by agreement.
"The issue of whether an oral contract or agreement exists presents questions
of both law and fact." Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 2003 UT 17,127, 71
P.3d 589; see also Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, f 17, 989
P.2d 1077. "In determining whether the parties created an enforceable contract, a
court should consider all preliminary negotiations, offers, and counteroffers and
interpret the various expressions of the parties for the purpose of deciding whether
the parties reached agreement on complete and definite terms." Flake, 2003 UT 17,
If 28. Firkins and Walter agreed to complete and definite terms, however, Firkins
is unable to recall the terms years later when his claim to title is challenged.
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Firkins and Walter negotiated and reached an agreement with regards to the
purchase and sale of the vehicles, thus forming a contract. Firkins initially though
the asking price was too high and told Walter to give him a call when he felt "real
about it." (Record 335, Bench Trial Transcript, p. 21,11. 8-14). This shows that
the parties discussed and negotiated a purchase price, however, six years later
Firkins has trouble recalling the purchase price. Firkins was unable to recall the
exact purchase price, but recalled the purchase price was between $50,000 to
$60,000. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 22,11. 5-8). At first, Firkins
denied the initial offer to purchase the inventory and vehicles, and when Walter
extended another offer, Firkins accepted. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p.
21,11. 8-14). Eventually, Walter accepted the offer from Firkins to purchase the
items, and the agreement was not reduced to writing, as part of the agreement
between the parties. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 22,11. 1-16). Walter
desired to hide assets and money from his ex-wife, therefore, this was a term of the
oral contract: the payments were to be in cash and the agreement was to be off the
books. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 22,11. 19-25). Therefore, the
preliminary negotiations, the initial offer and thefKthe subsequent offer and
acceptance show that Firkins and Walter expressed the desire and willingness to
negotiate an agreement of complete and definite terms. They agreed to a purchase
price, Walter turned over the vehicles, and later signed title over to Walter. Firkins
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never testified that a price was not reached, only that he could not recall the price.
Therefore, the present case is different from Carter v. Sorenson, where a contract
was found unenforceable because the parties did not agree on a price. Carter v.
Sorensen, 2004 UT 33,16, 90 P.3d 637.
II.

Firkins did not Default on the Contract that was Formed

Once the contract was formed, Firkins made payments to Walter when
demanded and Firkins held title for several years. Although Appellee asserts that
Firkins did not pay or perform under the contract, Walter decided not to involve
himself in the present action and did not offer any evidence or testimony as to the
fact that Firkins did not complete the terms of the contract. Furthermore, Walter
never filed any action against Firkins for non payment, nor did he insist on being a
lien holder on any issued title. Even when Walter had the Utah titles in his
possession with Firkins' name on them, he did not challenge Firkins as the title
holder. The parties that contracted, Walter and Firkins, have no legal dispute over
payment of money or any balance due.
The disadvantage that Firkins faces is that he made payments to Walter in
cash, to keep the agreement hidden from Walter's ex-wife. Firkins agreed to pay
for the vehicles at the end of the Olympics, that the payments were to be in cash,
and the agreement was to be "off the books." (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript,
p. 46 - p. 54). For several years, Firkins made cash payments to Walter. At trial,
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Firkins testified to the payments he made to Walter. (Record 335; Bench Trial
Transcript, p. 46 - p. 54). Firkins testified that he only started to keep track of his
payments starting in October of 2004 because "of tenuous nature of Mr. Walter's
behavior." (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 53 11. 17 - p. 54 11. 9). Firkins
also testified that sometimes he paid Walter's rent. (Record 335; Bench Trial
Transcript, p. 54,11. 6-10). Firkins stopped making payments when he believed he
had paid more than enough for the vehicles, because Walter did not keep accurate
records of what was owed. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 54,11. 13 - 19).
In the present case, the contract was clear enough for the parties to perform.
Firkins took the vehicles from Walter's possession, and Walter relinquished
possession of the vehicles. Walter signed necessary documents to transfer title to
Firkins. Walter also accepted payment from Firkins for several years. Therefore,
the contract was not so uncertain or indefinite that the intentions of the parties
cannot be ascertained. The parties' behavior supports that a binding contract
existed, even though both did not keep accurate records of payments. The parties
do not dispute if money is owed, thus, a valid contract was formed between the
parties, and Firkins performed under the contract.
Firkins' actions show that he relied upon the oral agreement. Over the
course of several years, Firkins made cash payments to Walter when demanded.
This performance by Firkins results in an enforceable contract. Partial
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performance of an oral contract can only result in enforcement of the contract if
"(1) the oral contract and its terms are clear and definite, (2) the acts done in
performing the contract are equally clear and definite, and (3) the acts are in
substantial reliance on the oral contract." Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 801
(Utah 1998); see Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983). Firkins agreed
to a purchase price, and relying upon their agreement, made cash payments to
Walter. There is no other reason why Firkins would make substantial cash
payments to Walter besides fulfilling his duty under the contract. Firkins did not
rent the vehicles; renters do not have legal title signed over to them. Firkins
substantially relied upon the oral contract to make the cash payments in order to be
the legal title holder to the vehicles. Only later did Walter fly into town and with
the help of Ruegner, hide the vehicles from Firkins and wash the titles through the
California DMV.
III.

Firkins Held Legal Title to the Vehicles

Contrary to Appellee's arguments, Firkins held title to the vehicles since
April, 2002. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 25,1. 24 - p. 26,1. 2).
Firkins was able to license and obtain Utah titles for the vehicles because Walter
mailed him the pink slip and California titles to the vehicles. (Record 335; Bench
Trial Transcript, p. 26,11. 3-12). Walter was not listed as a lien holder on the title,
nor did he apply to be a lien holder on the title at anytime. (Record 335; Bench
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Trial Transcript, p. 29,11. 10-16). Firkins obtained the titles from Walter. It was
not shown at trial that Firkins fraudulently or illegally obtained the titles.
Appellees makes much of the fact that Firkins signed an affidavit for duplicate
titles, however, these were only duplicates of the titles he held. He did not add his
name to the titles, not did he forge anyone's signature.
After the Olympics, the vehicles were stored in California, then they were
moved to New Mexico. Before moving the vehicles to New Mexico, Firkins
mailed Walter the titles in case a buyer may wish to purchase the vehicles. He did
not get the titles back even though they were held in his own name. (Record 335;
Bench Trial Transcript, p. 40,11. 20-22). At the time Firkins moved the vehicles
back to New Mexico, he had misplaced the titles, or had lost them - he no longer
had them in his possession. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 41,11. 1-6).
When back in New Mexico, Firkins applied for duplicate titles from the State of
Utah, and then titled the vehicles in New Mexico. (Record 335; Bench Trial
Transcript, p. 41,1. 3 - p. 43,1. 20). Walter had knowledge that the vehicles and
Firkins were in New Mexico, however, he again never applied for or was listed as
the lien holder on the New Mexico titles. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p.
44,11. 1-16). Therefore, the argument that Firkins held title suspiciously is
unfounded. However, Walter washed the titles through the California DMV to
present "clean" titles to Reugner.
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When Walter and Ruegner met to discuss the sale of the vehicles to
Ruegner, Walter showed Ruegner titles for the vehicles, however the titles were in
Firkins' name. Ruegner requested Walter to produce clean titles to the vehicles.
(Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 176,11. 6-12). The titles Walter produced
had Firkins name on them. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 197,11. 19-24).
In Ruegner's presence, Walter called a locksmith to break into the vehicles because
he didn't have keys, in an effort to repossess the vehicles. (Record 335; Bench
Trial Transcript, p. 177,11. 20-23). Ruegner then took possession of the vehicles
and stored them on his father's property until Walter could produce clean title.
(Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 178,11. 6-12); (Record 335; Bench Trial
Transcript, p. 198,11. 12-21). During this time, Ruegner was receiving phone calls
from Firkins informing him that he (Firkins) owned the vehicles. (Record 335;
Bench Trial Transcript, p. 199,1. 19 - p . 200,1. 12).
While the vehicles were stored in Utah by Ruegner, Walter obtained
California titles to the vehicles. Ruegner only moved the vehicles from his father's
property to have them weighed. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 201,11. 19). The certification of title from the State of California stated that the vehicles
were inspected by Ted Miller in the State of California on January 25, 2006, when
the vehicles were actually stored on Ruegner's father's property in Utah on
January 25, 2006. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 201,11. 10- p. 202.1.
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18). The application for California titles bear Firkins signature, however, Firkins
testified that the signature was not his. (Record 335; Bench Trial Transcript, p. 11
11. 2-11); (Exhibit P 13, also attached at Addendum). California issued the titles in
Walter's name, based upon Firkins forged signature and the fraudulent certificatioi
by Ted Miller that the vehicles were inspected. The California titles are based on
fraud and are void. Walter did not have proper title.
When the titles were washed through the California DMV, there became two
sets of titles to the same vehicles: a legal set (the New Mexico titles) and a set
based upon a forged signature (the titles held by Ruegner from the Utah DMV).
Curiously, Appellees make mention of a Power of Attorney, however, this
document was not used to wash the titles through the California DMV. Firkins'
forged signature was used to obtain the titles. The California titles are based upon
fraud, and the New Mexico titles are based upon a clear chain of title, stemming
from when Walter signed over title to Firkins. This evidence was not contradicted
at trial.
Lastly, contrary to Appellee's argument, the case of Lake Philgas is
remarkably different than the present case. Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank &
Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, (Utah App. 1993). Unlike Lake Philgas, Firkins and
Walter intended to transfer title, and in Lake Philgas, the seller did not forge
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documents to obtain title to the vehicles. Therefore, Firkins held title and Walter
had no legal standing to transfer title to Ruegner.

IV.

There was Insufficient Evidence to Support the Trial Court's
Finding that the Vehicles in Question were Worth $100,000 at the
Time of Conversion.

Of the evidence presented at trial, the only concete and tangible number
presented to determine the price is the actual sale price paid by Ruegner, $50,000.
Although catering trucks are difficult to value, the price should be based upon a
price determined by the market, not by speculation. Whether the amount awarded
by the district court was supported by the evidence is a determination of fact that
may be reversed on appeal only if clearly erroneous. Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT
58, HI 16, 23, 7 P.3d 783.
The testimony presented at trial shows that catering trucks can range in price
from $40,000 to $300,000 depending on the type of appliances and other features.
However, what is lacking is a determination of something comparable to the
catering truck sold to Ruegner by Walter. It is unknown what type of
specifications would cause a catering truck to be valued at $300,000 and what type
of specifications would cause a catering truck to be valued at $40,000. Generally,
the measure for damages in a conversion action is the value of the converted
property at the time of conversion, plus interest. Id. at 118 (citing Broadwater v.
12

Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1993)); Madsen v. Madsen, 72 Utah
96, 102, 269 P. 132, 134 (1928). This measure is appropriate because the remedy
for conversion is analogous to a forced sale of the converted property from the
plaintiff to the defendant. See 18 Am.Jur.2d Conversion § 105 (1985). To place
Ruegner in the same position had the tort of conversion not occurred, he would
receive the $50,000 he gave to Walter for payment of the vehicles. Therefore, the
appropriate amount of damages in the case would be $50,000 if Firkins is not
deemed to be the legal title holder of the vehicles.
V.

Firkins Did Not Convert Ruegner's Property
Firkins did not convert Ruegner's property. As stated above, Firkins had a

valid and enforceable contract with Walter. Firkins relied upon this oral contract
by sending cash to Walter and by holding title to the vehicles for several years.
Therefore, Firkins had a legal and lawful justification for taking the vehicles from
Ruegner's possession. He held valid New Mexico title to the vehicles. "A
conversion is an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and
possession." Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT App 355, ^ 9, 78 P.3d 988
(internal quotation marks omitted). Based upon the above analysis, Firkins had
legal right to take the vehicles from Ruegner's possession.
VI.

The Court was Correct in Not Awarding Lost Income Damages
13

The trial court was correct in not awarding lost income damages to Pig
Boys, because at trial, the amount of potential lost income could not be
determined. Pig Boys could not even produce evidence that would even allow for
any approximation as to the lost income. A reasonable approximation could not be
produced. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130, 1146 (Utah
2001).
In the present case, Ruegner testified that Pig Boys has approximately 75%
of the market share in Utah and he has not expanded his business outside of Salt
Lake City. (Evidentiary Hearing, p. 91,11. 5-9). Therefore, the question becomes
"how can Pig Boys increase their revenue and market share by adding another
catering truck?" If Pig Boys has 75% of the market share, it would have to be
proved at trial that with the additional catering truck he can increase his market
share and thus increase his revenue. However, no evidence was presented at trial
of how the second catering truck could increase Pig Boys marketing share. Pig
Boys saturates the market with their catering services. To try to prove lost income,
Pig Boys relied upon an expert witness, Ms. Dean.
To calculate the amount of revenue that the second catering truck could
produce, Ms. Dean basically took the revenue of one of Pig Boys' catering trucks
and used the revenue generated by that one truck to predict the revenue of another
truck. Ms. Dean assumed that Pig Boys' business depends on the number of trucks
14

they have, not how many catering jobs they have. Ms. Dean assumed that the
market share was endless and that somehow Pig Boys could increase the market
share to 150% from their 75%. Ms. Dean's analysis was faulty and naive. In fact,
the court stated, "[T]he Court takes issue with her methodology, takes issue with
her assumption and finds that based upon my analysis as to the [faulty]
assumptions and the methodology, the Court is not convinced that her method and
her figures are the accurate figures regarding the loss of revenue or loss of income;
therefore the Court respectfully rejects her testimony as to potential loss of income,
loss of revenue." (Evidentiary Hearing, p. 174,11. 9-21). The court was correct to
not follow Ms. Dean's analysis.
Besides Ms. Dean's analysis, Ruegner testified that while the catering truck
was out of his control and possession, he only turned down approximately three
catering jobs, and he did not bid on any other catering jobs. (Evidentiary Hearing,
p. 79, 129 - 130). Therefore, it is unknown how much income Ruegner lost by not
having the catering truck. In fact, Ruegner testified that he has seen a decline in
his business because filming crews were choosing to film in other states and not in
Utah. (Evidentiary Hearing, p. 90,11. 19-22). Since Defendants could not produce
evidence at trial of what the lost income would be, the Court was correct in not
allowing Defendants to recover loss income. However, under the damages
analysis at trial, Pig Boys paid $50,000 for a catering truck and was compensated
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$100,000 for the vehicle, while seeing a decline in their catering business. (It
should be noted that Pig Boys did not request that the catering vehicle be returned,
but allowed Firkins to keep the vehicles). In essence, Pig Boys has seen their
investment double with the present lawsuit.
VII. The Court was correct in Not Awarding Punitive Damages.
The court was correct in not awarding punitive damages to Pig Boys. To
award punitive damages, Utah courts look for egregious conduct. Mahana v. Onyx
Acceptance Corp., 96 P.3d 893, 902 (Utah 2004). Firkins did not act in any
egregious manner. After the vehicles he held title to since 2002 were stolen and
secretly held on Ruegner's family property, Firkins took back the vehicles. His
ownership interest in the vehicles were never challenged, they were just taken from
him. Before Firkins recaptured the vehicles, Firkins notified Ruegner of his
ownership claim several times. Firkins did not act in an egregious manner.
CONCLUSION
Walter and Firkins had a binding contract for the sale and purchase of the
vehicles. The contract, when formed, consisted of an offer, an acceptance, and
consideration. Walter and Firkins behaved per the contract for several years.
Firkins agreed to purchase the vehicles under Walter' specific terms. Walter never
sued Firkins for lack of payment or breach of contract. Instead, Walter took the
vehicles by forging Firkins signature and obtaining California titles in order to sell
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the vehicles to Ruegner. Ruegner and Pig Boys, Inc. do not have legal title to the
vehicles. Therefore, the Court should reverse the District Court's ruling that there
was no contract between Firkins and Walter and find that Firkins is the proper
legal title holder and owner of the vehicles.

Dated this \J day of February, 2009.

01{yiaT). Uitto, Attorney for Appellant
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